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I. INTRODUCTION

The existing body of international law is rooted in the state as both
its subject and its object. Be it the result of formal agreement, custom,
consensus or dominance, states have long argued and fought over the
scope, form and reach of international law and molded it to both serve
*
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and constrain the cardinal norm of sovereignty.' But in today's interconnected world, the map of international law looks increasingly like a
mosaic of disconnected pieces: shaped by many hands, interpreted by
many voices, colored by numerous contexts, made up of a huge variety
of materials. The traditional sources of international law must now make
room for what has been referred to in this issue, in shorthand, as "the
2
new sources of international law"?
We have reached a point when lawyers' commissions are summoned
to discuss the consequences of legal proliferation as an ill threatening the
standing of international law through incompatibility or irrelevance.
Should this trend towards fragmentation be reversed? Should we devise
a legal non-proliferation treaty? Or should we, conversely, welcome the
current diversification in the sources of law as reflecting the realities of
today's world, as a reflection of the flexibility and adaptability of law
when the norm of sovereignty on which it is based is itself undergoing
considerable recalibration? In short: how should we deal theoretically as
well as practically with the diversification of sources of law?
Addressing the dilemma of cacophony versus diversity requires returning to some of the prior questions that have long occupied the
energies of the international law community.' The concern over diversity
I.
There are of course countless contemporary analyses of the changing shape of sovereignty. See e.g., STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPocIusY (1999); DANIEL
PHILPOTT, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED MODERN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (2001); Robert 0. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the
UnitedStates, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 743 (2002).
2.
The traditional sources of international law generally stem from:
a.
international Conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b.
c.
d.

international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3
Bevans 1153, 1187, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/
ibasicstatute.htm. In the domestic sphere, the split between state and moral law is clear. However, in international law, it is becoming far less clear, hence the sudden increase in new norms
created by non-legal principles (i.e., not created by a legislative body or by court precedent)
not included in the traditional sources listed in the ICJ statute.
3.
Numerous scholars have analyzed and discussed the direction of international law.
See Georges Abi-Saab, Fragmentationor Unification: Some Concluding Remarks, 31 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 919 (1999); David Kennedy, My Talk at the ASIL: What is New Thinking in
InternationalLaw, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 104 (2000); Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword:
Is the Proliferationof InternationalCourts and Tribunals a Systemic Problem?, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999). Compare Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983), with Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativiy in
InternationalLaw, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 305 (1993).
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is of course grounded in the waning of state sovereignty generally but it
is, simply and more pragmatically to start with, a concern intrinsic to law
itself and the possible conflicts induced by multiple arenas and jurisdictions where law is shaped and applied. One of the starting assumptions
here is that external relevance of the law, its capacity to "speak truth to
power" is in part a function of its internal consistency as well as the legitimacy of the processes that preside over its elaboration. This is at
least, the concern prevalent in the legal community. In the Introduction,
Bruno Simma tells the story of the UN Commission on the "fragmentation of international law" and how its agenda evolved from denouncing
the "risks" of fragmentation to simply assessing "difficulties."
We recognize three overlapping underlying concerns in this agenda.
First, and most pragmatically, lawyers fear a growing overlap and confusion of mandate between different legal regimes and, as a result, a
duplication of efforts and a waste of resources. Second, we see a further
concern about competition between various legal orders or regimes perhaps developed by different courts or responding to different issue areas
or geographic spheres. As different actors compete to be the most relevant or influential, their actions or pronouncements may enter into
conflict. And with conflict of laws or legal regimes and no higher appellate authority, law becomes unpredictable and a poor recourse. Third, as
a result of the previous two, a fear emerges of the weakening of legitimacy for law in general. The lack of consistency, thus exposed, puts in
doubt any pretense of "legal objectivity" or "normative absolutes," which
help inspire compliance among the actors involved. Once these three
categories of concerns are acknowledged, however, the question is: can
the problems be addressed by curbing fragmentation/diversity, or is it
impossible to "put the genie back in the bottle" so that solutions must be
found within, rather than in denial of the new state of affairs.
The Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw brought together twentyfive scholars and practitioners for its 25th Anniversary Symposium to
tackle some (and only some!) of these issues. By the end of the day, most
questions remained unanswered, as is the essence of scholarship.
In this concluding Article, we attempt to give a glimpse of our debates. We begin by describing the object of the debate, namely what
diversity means in international law.4 We then turn to the preeminent
question of the symposium, does diversity mean cacophony or should it
be music to our ears? In particular, we recognize that lawyers and
4.
Kennedy describes international law within the idea of a professional discipline.
Kennedy, supra note 3. By setting the stage in this manner, scholars can examine international
law through a different lens. The authors have tried to apply this concept to bridge the international relations and law arenas.
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political scientists have different standpoints when they ask whether diversity is good or bad, or if it should be promoted or counteracted. We
suggest three normative benchmarks for the debate: effectiveness, justice
and democracy. Finally, we highlight some of the many avenues opened
for further enquiry by the discussions-in particular, the promise that
lies with the notions of horizontality and mutuality and we advocate
bringing politics back in. In the end, we believe with others that diversity
does not spell the end of the international legal world, but rather calls for
a redefinition and refocusing of the original ideals of international law.
II. THE MEANING OF DIVERSITY: CHANGING SHAPERS
AND SHAPES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Diversity, or diversification, means all things to all people. It is generally infused with positive feelings-not simply in the international
legal sphere. Diversity in friendship is usually synonymous with openmindedness and forward-thinking. At the same time, the perception of a
darker side of diversity is never far, in the form of loss of cohesion and
increased chaos.'
So what does "diversity" mean today in the international legal
sphere? First, it simply means that, compared with its origins four centuries ago, a lot more actors "do it:" more states and more non-state actors.
Second, these various actors do it across an increasingly broad array of
issues and using an increasingly broad spectrum of instruments. Third, and
most importantly, the nature of the law itself has changed dramatically in
comparison with what we call the traditional "international law core."
A. From the End of the Colonial Legal Order to the Demise of
Sovereignty: New Subjects of InternationalLaw
There is of course a vigorous debate over the original source of international law, including how and to what extent it was shaped by
Westphalia.6 Yet, some authors would argue that international law as we
know it was shaped a century earlier by Francisco de Vitoria who first
initiated the turn from religious to secular law. Vitoria was the first theologian to challenge the reigning medieval idea of the Pope's universal
5.
The University of Michigan where the syniposium took place recently witnessed an
intense dispute over affirmative action where the arguments exchanged across the table tellingly reflected the Janus-faced character of diversity. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 982
(2003).
6.
Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 981 (2004); Stephen Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared
Sovereignty, and InternationalLaw, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981 (2004).

Summer 2004]

1353

Diversity or Cacophony?

jurisdiction by virtue of his divine prerogative to spread Christian "law."
Instead, he argued, a new system of international law must be premised
on the need to promote freedom to travel and trade, thus in passing
spreading Christianity through other means. However, in his view, the
sovereign, that is the entity entitled to wage a "just war," could never be
an "Indian." The Indian was only included in his system to be disciplined
under the law. In order to be ruled according to the interests of the home
country, the "Other" in essence, had to be subjugated. Thus, the Conquistador replaced God as the ultimate source of law "across borders. 7
This construct, picked up by Grotius and "Westphalianised," shaped
for centuries to come a uniquely Western idea of the rights and duties of
colonizing states and colonized peoples and the implied requisite for
order in international relations.8 In this sense, modern day international
law originated from necessity.
If international law thus began as a western hegemonic project, as an
elaborate secular rationalization for the subjugation of Europe's "Others," the first question to ask regarding new sources is to what extent
international law is now written by these liberated "Others." If the original purpose of international law was to impose the idea of boundaries
and, in addition, project the reality of European boundaries onto the rest
of the world, then these "Others" must be included, if only to make good
the promise that the law has become an instrument to mitigate, rather
than magnify, power asymmetries in the world.
Therefore, perhaps the diversification of sources of law addresses the
continued asymmetry between states as both subjects and objects of international law, dealing with the challenge posed by the proliferation of
states themselves as subjects of international law, with their different
degrees of legal and political development! But such proliferation in
turn raises problems of its own, such as how international law can be
written and applied by lawless countries. Furthermore, to what extent
can transnational communities serve as sources of law in a world originally designed as a state-to-state game?
A postcolonial agenda for international law, an agenda that is still
very much in the making, must try to acknowledge normative relativity
(in Weil's terminology) without falling prey to cultural relativism. It
must grapple with the tension of international law as both a reflecting
7.

FRANCISCO VITORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELLI RELECTIONES (ON THE INDIANS

AND ON THE LAW OF WAR) (Ernest Nys ed., John Pawley Bate trans.

1917) (1557).

8.
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACS (THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE) (1646);
see also ANDREW HURRELL & ROSEMARY FOOT, ORDER AND JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL

(2003).
9.
See P.S. Rao, Multiple InternationalJudicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing
Strength of InternationalLaw or Its Fragmentation?,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 929 (2004).
RELATIONS
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and mitigating power. It must build on what already exists: a world
where international law can empower agents of the state (as well as nonstate agents) across boundaries, as when a British court internalizes and
applies the European Convention on Human Rights without the express
stamp of approval of Westminster; or when a judge from a South African
country rewrites the TRIPS agreement when no coalition of developing
countries had been able to accomplish the feat.
Many analysts tend to skip the crucial and foundational issue of inter-state asymmetry of power in their capacity to shape as well as deflect
international law, to move directly onto a ubiquitous post-Westphalian
narrative which makes the all too simplistic "end of sovereignty" the beall and end-all of current change in the international system. Who would
deny that the vault of sovereignty has become unsealed?' Or that noninterference in internal state matters has become a highly contested
norm?" The question is to what extent and with what consequences: Is
sovereignty really an "endangered species"?! Clearly, as Dan Sarooshi
and Stephen Krasner argue, sovereignty has always been conditional and
contested.' 2 Powerful states have never had a "hands-off' approach to
other states' actions within the confines of their territorial borders. International organizations have long been in the business of managing such
conditionality in every domain. What is new, however, is not the very
partial and asymmetric constraining of states by each other, but the
emergence of new subjects of international law. In short, the bursting of
the sovereignty bubble is both the cause and effect of the proliferation of
agents in world politics.

10.
See Philpott, supra note 6. Scholars have long debated the multifaceted status of
sovereignty. See generally KRASNER, supra note 1; John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modem: A
New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2003); Richard H. Steinberg,
Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 329 (2004).
See Dan Sarooshi, The Essentially Contestable Nature of the Concept of
11.
Soverighty: Implicationsfor the Exercise by InternationalOrganizationsof Delegated Powers
of Government, 25 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1107 (2004).
12.
See Sarooshi, supra note 11; Krasner, supra note 6.
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FIGURE I
13
DIVERSITY: PROLIFERATION OF ACTORS

As illustrated in Figure 1, Joseph Nye has summarized this phenomenon as a twin governance shift from the state level both vertically
(towards the intergovernmental or to the sub-national level) and horizontally (from the public to the private and third party sector). 14
Globalization increasingly leads to the transfer of governance functions
from the state level to the intergovernmental or non-governmental corporate, regional and transnational sites of power. But if the state is not
crowded out but remains at the center of a more crowded field, the state
may still, to a certain extent, serve as the main channel for the diversification of sources of law. And if, as Dan Sarooshi points out, international
organizations provide a forum where conceptions of sovereignty can be
debated and contested rather than superseded, these organizations are not
structurally inimical to new subjects of international law. Conversely, if
private legal regimes create laws without the state, as analyzed in this
issue by Gunther Teubner,"5 does this necessarily imply that global private law makers contest state boundaries? For instance, Internet service
providers create law and artificial boundaries through cooperation with
credit card companies and policing their clients.
In short, from Vitoria onwards, great international law scholars have
attempted to create their own version of international law, thereby maintaining the supremacy of their own culture. But such attempts to impose
a single unified theory from above unavoidably conflict with the efforts
of those "in the real world" to do what they want: their actions can't all
be simply declared illegal! And while Vitoria's times made it possible
simply to deny the diversity that already existed, diversity today simply
13.

(2000).
14.

JOSEPH

S.

NYE & JOHN

D.

DONAHUE, GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Id. In this scheme, "supranational" actors may consist of international organizations

or tribunals-regional and global as well as specialized or universal institutions. Similarly the

third sector shift ranges from transnational communities to advocacy networks.
15.
Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MicH. J. INT'L L. 999 (2004).
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won't go away. The increased potential for diversity in the sources of
international law is the byproduct of rather fundamental developments in
global and domestic political economy, technology and politics. Supranationalgovernance called for by trans-border problems and technology
leads to the emergence of supra- or rather trans-national actors. Democratizationleads to the questioning of state monopoly over the making or
interpretation of law. Privatizationopens up spaces for the private production of norms. 16 And decentralization at the national or regional level
creates a demand for links between levels of governance that may or
may not include the state. The question that concerns us here is how
these trends in global politics ultimately affect the sources of international law.
B. DelegationAcross Issues and Stages of Law
Given the proliferation of non-state actors, the question inevitably
arises as to whether these actors compete or collaborate with the state.
Or more specifically, to what degree and through which channel do these
actors collaborate with the state at different stages or levels of lawmaking: formation, interpretation, enforcement, implementation (or internalization as Harold Koh terms). 7
Joost Pauwelyn's contribution illustrates the difficulty of defining
and assessing conflicts of law in light of the many dimensions along
which law can be disaggregated, e.g., prohibition versus permission,
command versus exemption. Pauwelyn specifically identifies four areas
of potential conflict in the formation arena: 1) conflicts between or
among established norms, 2) inherent normative conflict,'" 3) prioritization of norms either through lex specialis or lex posterior,'9 and 4) treaty
conflict where only one party is bound and compliance to one treaty will
essentially violate the duties in the other.2 ° Because law makers can also
differ, conflict also stems from enforcement. Proliferation increases the
number of different organizations, such as the WTO, that have jurisdic16.
See Thomas Carbonneau, ArbitralLaw Making, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1183 (2004).
17.
Formation occurs when an international norm is created. Interpretation is how different bodies or states choose to understand that given norm. Enforcement is the international
system as a whole imposing norms on given actors. Finally, implementation or internalization
is how the actor chooses to execute the norm domestically or within the organization. See
Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization,54 INT'L ORG. 401 (2000) [hereinafter
Legalization]; Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankle Lecture: Bringing InternationalLaw
Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623 (1998).
18.
When two norms conflict and one is clearly illegal, the illegal norm is terminated.
Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentationand Unity: InternationalLaw as a Universe of InterConnected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 903, 907 (2004).
Id. at 908.
19.
20.
See id. at 909.
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tion over issues (for example, both trade and as an offshoot, the related
environmental aspect). Once the body has jurisdiction, many different
laws are often applicable. These laws may provide legitimate defenses
which are not specified in that body, fill gaps in the procedure, or strip
the body of jurisdiction. In some cases, other applicable laws may show
that another body is more competent. 2' Furthermore, interpretation of
treaties or norms never ceases-Pauwelyn, along with many others,
views treaties as evolutionary interpretation rather than strict constructionist view.22 In the end, Pauwelyn argues that all of international law is
binding on these disparate bodies which may choose to exercise jurisdiction, and thus theoretically, there should be no conflict.
If the state delegates or if a non-state actor appropriates a role traditionally played by the state at a certain stage or in certain issue-areas,
how does that delegation or appropriation affect other stages and/or other
issue-areas? To complicate matters, not only do we have delegation or
appropriation of state authority to make law, but also the progressive
autonomy of the bodies within which such delegation takes place. The
form and degree of power transfers varies across issue areas where
widely different trade-offs between alternative values, goals and objectives shape the law. As Teubner discusses, how each of these spheres of
autonomous global villages carve out their own rationality reflects
broader processes of fragmentation in the global society. 23 In sum, the
impact of delegation itself must be disaggregated to reflect the variety of
stages in which it occurs and the ways in which these in turn interact to
create more or less inconsistency between variants of the law spoken on
these different stages.
At this stage, one can also investigate how the quality of processes at
one stage of the process affects its quality at another, how the sources of
law formation for instance affect its interpretation or enforcement. Along
these lines Koh and others demonstrate in which ways the degree and
mode of participation of various actors as reflected in transnational political processes significantly affects the quality of internalization of
international law in the domestic realm.
Here, the reader will easily buy into the fears of cacophony picked
up in this project: not only do we have too many instruments in the orchestra but the simultaneous participation of many orchestras, all
following subtle variants of the international law score-itself a symphonie inachevee constantly being affected by the interpretation of the
music by these many orchestras. Let us summarize all of the
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 911-13.

Id. at 908.
See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 15.
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complexity described above as movement along one dimension: increased delegation or proliferation of actors across functional areas. In
this sense, "proliferation" of sources of law means not only moving
away from the monopoly of the state as the subject of international law
in a pre-delegation world, but perhaps and most importantly that the
state that is making law on the international scene is itself disaggregated. Therefore, the state may act in many arenas at once without
necessarily coordinating these actions. 4
C. Diversificationalong FourAttributes: Delegation,
Consent, Precision,and Binding Nature
The diagnosis of diversity does not stop here. What has long
seemed problematic about diversification in the world of law has less
to do with the "who" or the "how" and more to do with the "what," the
character of law itself. In this sense, proliferation as discussed above is
the most obvious expression of diversity. In addition, it is also the
cause of diversification of sources, understood as what now "counts"
as the legitimate expression of international law. To greatly simplify,
diversification may be described as the interaction between delegation
or proliferation and the changing nature of the law itself. Likewise, this
changing nature can be described along three attributes or dimensions,
namely: 1) whether the law is based on state consent, 2) whether it is
precise and clear, and 3) whether it is binding on the state and possibly
other actors. Together, these four attributes constitute what we could
call the international law "core." Diversification describes the way in
which international law is effectively moving away from this traditional core.

24.

See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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FIGURE 2
MOVING AWAY FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CORE

More delegation

t

Less precsonW

a

Less binding

Less state consent

In a world defined by the international legal core, states consent to
precise obligations with a narrow margin of interpretation by international and domestic courts, which are considered as binding. These
characteristics are of course mutually reinforcing. Official state consent
to the laws make binding character of those laws acceptable. The precision of the law stems from state involvement, because states are more
likely than other actors to specify the obligations that will bind them.
The question then becomes, how much deviation ought to be allowed
from this traditional core or to what extent should law accommodate
5
what Prosper Weil calls nonnative relativity."
Whether or not there
should be a numerus closus for the formal sources of law is a question
raised on the demand side, by the world in which we live, but should law
makers in the guise of politicians, representatives, diplomats, judges or26
scholars accommodate such a demand, and supply the rationale for it?
How much variation from the core should now be tolerated or even encouraged?
To be sure, traditional law has long accommodated some variation
along the precise versus vague spectrum in the form of hard and soft
25.
26.

Weil, supra note 3.
Fastenrath, supra note 3.
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law.27 So-called "hard" law defines rights and obligations while "soft
law" is substantively vague." Prosper Weil argues that the typology of
the law has no bearing on whether the law is a legal norm which itself
can be either soft or hard. 29 The law's binding character has always varied, as norms can either be merely binding or peremptory-those which
all participants agree cannot be broken (e.g., genocide). While originally
recognition of a norm resulted in legal rights and obligations, now norms
are relative. 0 Some have greater weight than others. Because the status
of international legal personality now embraces international organizations (including for instance the European Union) and in some cases,
even individuals, this flexibility has extended to the question of subjects
of international law (e.g., the first dimension of delegation discussed
above).
But the issue that most occupies legal scholars is probably that of
consent. To what extent, they ask, can international law afford lesser
consent and still be called international law? Lesser content can of
course come in many guises: does it need to be explicit or can it stay
implicit? Should consent be expressed multilaterally or only unilaterally? Individually or collectively, as shared sovereignty? Can we
countenance a community of states accepting a new jus cogens without
the need for consent at all? Or, at least, can we lay out agreed ("legal")
conditions under which consent can be bypassed altogether, as with the
current debate over sovereignty as responsibility? In such a world, the
right to make consent a prerequisite for compliance becomes a function
of whether sovereignty is still deserved or not. Accordingly, not all states
deserve an equal right to consent to laws that will then be enforced upon
them. And if state sovereignty can be bypassed on the basis of so-called
shared values, how specifically should such state values be expressed?
In the end, exploring the diversification of sources of international
law requires a systematic exploration of the correlation, and indeed the
causal linkages between these four dimensions, whereby each different
bundle of variation gives us a different angle on such diversity. Which of
these combinations matters most? What is the changing relationship between consent and the binding character of the law? Do laws necessarily
become less binding as the need for consent lessens, or is the decrease in
consent compensated through other attributes such as vagueness of the
27.
Legalization, supra note 17, at 409; Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Hardand
Soft Law in InternationalGovernance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421 (2000); Weil, supra note 3, at 414;
see also David Kennedy, My Talk at the ASIL: What is New Thinking in InternationalLaw?,
94 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 104 (2000).
28.
Weil, supra note 3, at 414.
29.
Id. at 414.
30.
Id. at 421.
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law (as when the EU's move towards increased shared sovereignty goes
along a move to soft law)? Under what conditions does the increased
delegation to non-state actor require a lessening in the binding character
of the law? And how binding should we consider unilateral (non-consent
based) acts of states to be-like France in the ICJ decision on nuclear
testing3 (a question of particular interest to the International Law Commission)? This is not the place to summarize the numerous ways in
which variants of these questions have been explored by legal scholars.
Suffice to show that many ways exists in which diversity in the sources,
and therefore, the character of international law can come about and
evolve. Let us now turn to the next question: So what?
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW V. POLITICS:
DIVERSITY AS FRAGMENTATION OR ADAPTATION?

What then is the problem with diversity in international law? Is the
blossoming of international law truly problematic, an unfortunate byproduct to be managed, and a threat to be avoided?32 If so, what is the
problem to be worried about? In short: has diversity gone too far?
The question of course has been the object of debate among international legal scholars themselves, whose views range from benevolent"let a hundred legal flowers bloom"-to the alarmists-"it's a legal jungle out there." Of course, the debate has moved on since 1983, when
Prosper Weil viewed and denounced fragmentation as a pathological development. Nevertheless, a clash of opinion, even perhaps of culture,
exists between those in the legal profession who fear a world where international law surrenders to uncontrollable subjective processes and
those who see such developments as inherent in the very nature of international law. In between are those who say yes to the expansion of
international law but ask: at what price?
Let us recall Prosper Weil's seminal argument. Norms, as he saw it,
are imposed on nations by the international community which determines their status and is inherently "different. 33 The legitimacy of
international law stems from the ideas of comity and erga omnes law.
Nations abide by international norms because they represent the law of
consensus3 and are rarely reviewed by courts. Furthermore, international
31.
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
32.
Rao, supra note 9.
33.
Weil highlights the inherent structural differences between domestic and international law such as inadequate enforcement as well as indefinite norms. Weil, supra note 3, at
413-14. Because international norms can be either soft or hard, rather than clearly legal or
illegal as in the domestic sphere, this vagueness creates imprecision in international law.
34.
Id.
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law originally stemmed from treaties. "The fundamental international
legal principle of pacta sunt servanda means that the rules and
commitments contained in legalized international agreements are regarded as obligatory, subject to various defenses or exceptions, and not
to be disregarded as preferences change" 35 Social agendas should not be
imposed on states. Proliferation weakens international law as a system
and a tool.
At the other end of the spectrum, scholars like Howard Koh, argue
that international norms can and should come from many different
places and sources.36 Koh uses the examples of the twelve mile territorial
sea and the landmine convention to show how the internalization of international norms depends in part on accepting such proliferation.
Instead of a requirement of formal recognition of norms, which Prosper
Weil advocates, Koh finds that different types of norm "champions" help
create norms that are effectively internalized into the domestic sphere.
Internalization can come from social, political and legal arenas with
multiple actors promoting different norms.37 Social internalization of
international norms occurs when the public believes so greatly in an idea
that it becomes a standard (landmine treaty). Political internalization
occurs when the political leaders embrace and propagate an international
norm. Legal internalization occurs when the international norm is disseminated through the domestic system either by judicial interpretation,
or by legislative and executive action. Howard Koh's description of norm
creation takes in, for instance, the approach of "grassroots" political organization in the United States. Using all channels available to them,
including the Web and even comic strip characters, norm champions
rally public support for their norms. Instead of the idea of state compliance, Koh argues that states obey those laws which they deem
legitimate." Norm champions help create legitimacy which in turn is key
to legal effectiveness. 39 As international law is interpreted through legislation and statutes and enforced through courts, policing and patterns of
habits, diversity in its origins allows for a broadening of its reach.
In the end, however, debates which take place on the terrain of international law remain centered on the system itself, the desirability of its
flexibility-the distance traveled from the core. Koh's position takes us
some way to a shift of criterion from one of internal consistency to
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
ABRAM

Legalization, supra note 27, at 409.
Koh, supra note 17.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 680.
On the issue of compliance and effectiveness of international law, see for instance
CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH

INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995).
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external relevance. Diachronic openness, dynamic interpretation and
flexibility provide a guarantee of relevance to the heterogeneous nature
of the world. But, for a radical questioning of the importance of the debate itself, one must turn to another breed of scholars, one for which
international law is not a starting point, but merely one element in a
game of power and interest between states.
Mainstream political scientists in international relations confront this
debate over diversity as somewhat of a storm in a teacup. They start, not
with the international law "core" but with state behavior. And for them,
to paraphrase Kagan, international law is a Kantian island in a Hobbesian world. 40 Law does not have causal forces unmediated by power and
interests. Thus, the only relevant question is whether states or other actors in the international system are likely to find the island of
international law at all as they search their way towards cooperation in
an ocean of international anarchy. After all, we unlikely to see powerful
actors in the world respect the principle of non-intervention in weaker
states, where the domestic structure of the weaker state might threaten
the national security of the powerful actors.
FIGURE

3

Lesspreci-~~

Lessstel

In the journey of the state through the troubled waters of anarchy,
David Kennedy's legal cognitive maps may help, but actors must first
find the island in the first place.42 In other words, the most plausible

40.
Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL'Y REv. 3 (2002), available at
http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.htnl.
41.
Krasner, supra note 6.
42.
Kennedy, supra note 3.
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alternative to law-based inter-course between states is no agreement at
all rather than a more unified law.
To be sure, international relations scholars vary greatly in their
treatment of international law. 43 Realists-at least for those who accept
that the legal island is more than a mirage-tend to side with legal realists and tend to prefer a single beacon emitting a loud and clear signal on
the part of the most powerful players. In this light, Security Council
resolutions are not born equal-Resolution 678 is normatively better
than 144 1.44
Functionalists and institutionalists on the other hand see diversity as
the very precondition of what Robert Keohane et al. have called the legalization of world politics. 45 The bigger the island, the betterfragmentation equals variance; variance equals relevance. The breath of
the legal repertoire allows states and other agents to formulate the appropriate approach to the issue at stake, or, in negotiation contexts to
locate the ever illusive "zone of possible agreements," and thus enter into
cooperative deals. In other words: "if you build it they will come" as long
as both sheds and palaces can be built on the international law island.
Liberals may not disagree, but they focus on whether there are
enough different types of harbors around the island capable of handling
the diversity of domestic demands and constraints. In his contribution
William Burke-White discusses for instance mixed tribunals as great
examples of delegation which are domestic enough to be legitimate,
while remaining foreign enough to blame outsiders for turning someone
in.4 The link between supranationality and the impact of domestic structures on international law and order is in fact a theme pervading this
volume, from Saskia Sassen's discussion of denationalized structures 47 to
Stephen Krasner's weak structures48 to Dan Sarooshi's connection between these structures and the contestation of sovereignty. 4 These
analyses converge in showing to what extent the diversification of the
43.
For a thorough review of the interaction between international law and international
relations bringing together several strands in the field see the issue on legalization in INT'L
ORG.

(2000).

44.
Compare Resolution 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (1990),
with Resolution 1441, U.N. SCOR, 4644 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 (2002). The 1990 resolution explicitly authorized use of force while the 2002 resolution merely gave Iraq "a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" or it would face serious consequences. The 2002 resolution was imprecise as to whether it authorized use of force.
45.
Legalization,supra note 27.
46.
William Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963
(2004).
47.
Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participation, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 1141 (2004).
48.
Krasner, supra note 6.
49.
Sarooshi, supra note 11.
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sources of international law itself is a product of the diversity of local
realities. To be sure, there are definitely those among international relations scholars who share the same positivist mindset of some of the law
scholars, attracted to hierarchical approaches and gripped with the
Schmittian anxiety of disorder if one cannot identify who, or at least
what ultimate norm, decides. But, in general, these concerns are overridden by an embrace of diversification of law as a reflection of the world
around us rather than its perversion.
IV. THE NEW WORLD ORDER:
WHAT NORMATIVE BENCHMARKS?

At a more general level, the debate in this issue is about our continuing quest for a sustainable world order where disagreements between
contributors have to do in no small part with the extent to which each
believes this quest rest with international law itself. Specifically, each
author is engaged in positive or normative exercises in translationtranslation between domestic and global legal systems-and in the context of this project asks how such translation is affected by the
multiplication of sources of law.
Here we suggest that the normative assessment of diversity is generally based on one of three criteria: 1) effectiveness; 2) democracy; and 3)
justice.
A. Effectiveness
While most agree that there is a greater need for specialization or division of labor globally, the debate really centers on labeling what is lost
and should be recovered: consistency, predictability or unity of law. Inconsistency of the law affects its predictability and reliability and
therefore leaves the field open to power politics. Yet, is it not impossible
for the law to address the complexity of issues and contexts dealt with
today at the global level without giving up its unity? Here, different
strategies that try to reconcile effectiveness and complexity borrow significantly from different disciplinary metaphors, such as economics,
physics and biology.
There is nostalgia but little appetite for the physics metaphor, where
chaos is no bar to higher laws-where Mandel brought an infinite set of
fractals which can all be defined by a single equation. At the other end of
the spectrum the economics metaphor seems more relevant as it teaches
that increasingly specialized tasks can be coordinated by market
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mechanisms. In the legal sphere, this becomes a market for legal norms
through regulatory competition. 5°
Most contributors, however, have a distinct preference for the middle
ground thus turning to the biological metaphor where increased complexity calls for increased specialization (cells form organs, which
together form systems) which in turn calls for more connections (between cells and organs) in order to create more complex, but single
organisms. P.S. Rao5' claims that with maturity comes specialization and
with John Jackson52 and Joost Pauwelyn 3 illustrates his point with the
example of a WTO generally effective in resolving international trade
disputes. 54 Yet we also know that WTO runs into trouble when having to
deal with so-called "trade and. . ." issues where it needs to interact and
overlap with other international legal regimes.
Hence if we ask what makes the cells work best together, the answer
for most analysts has to do with the system itself, the kind of connections which exist between each task. Some of the authors in the volume
seek to provide a heuristic to analyze this function, as with Gerhard Hafner's formal mechanisms for conflict avoidance,55 Gunther Teubner's
notion of "networked regimes"56 or Saskia Sassen "network of states.
Alternatively, an optimal functioning of the system will stem from the
inherent properties of the cells themselves Do we need a single conductor or for the instruments to listen to each other better?
B. Democracy
Beyond effectiveness which delivers what political scientists call
"output legitimacy," most authors agree that so-called "input legitimacy"
or the legitimacy stemming from the process itself is paramount. 8 Aren't
we really trying to translate our understanding of the relationship between law and democracy from the domestic to the global sphere? The
emphasis on the role of law helps to resist the easy analogies between
50.
See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 15; John Jackson, The Varied Policies
of InternationalJuridical Bodies-Reflections on Theory and Practice, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
869 (2004); Sassen, supra note 47.
51.
See Rao, supra note 9.
52.
Jackson, supra note 50.
53.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 18.
54.
One further supporting factor is the number of countries participating in the WTO,
as well as the number of countries that wish to participate.
55.
Gerhard Hafner, Prosand Cons Ensuingfrom Fragmentationof InternationalLaw,
25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 849 (2004).
56.
See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 15.
57.
Sassen, supra note 47.

58.
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL VISION].
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global and domestic democracy which tend to adopt a narrow and impoverished view of democracy as a type of "competition for votes,"
where diversity is acknowledged either through a world parliament or
through purely domestic contestation and indirect accountability. Good
laws may not necessarily emerge from a vibrant marketplace of ideas
and NGO participation, but it is important to distinguish the value of
intellectual competition from the contention that the "rational" basis for
NGO participation is representation. Global democratization is about
access and inclusiveness, not representation.
How should international law relate to states that are themselves disaggregated? 9 In effect, disaggregation is bound to be trans-national as
soon as we acknowledge that domestic democracy can not do all the
work. But who decides what should be the boundaries of the polity for
the right level of aggregation of interests? To what extent should the production of law be freed from the considerations of the relevant "we" as
discussed by Dan Sarooshi? Olli Lagerspetz's account of the bias inherent in the choice of national symbols-who are "we"-makes clear once
again the inherently constructed character of nation-states as a communities of identity and lays bare claims that they might hold a monopoly on
legitimacy. 60 Why should such communities of identity be the only ones
to be institutionalized through law? Increasingly, polities are being built
around communities of project whereby groups of people-in some
cases all of mankind-chose to confront risks and opportunities together.1
More often than not, discussions about global democracy turn into
ones about procedural norms as interpreted by dispute resolution bodies.
Keohane highlights three dimensions of international delegation crucial
to the issue of dispute resolution: 1) independence; 2) access; and 3) embeddedness.
Independence is the freedom with which international adjudicators
can render judgments independently of state influence. Selection and tenure, legal discretion, and financial and human resources are important
factors in determining the independence of the adjudicators.62 If the true
ideal is to have legitimate decisions rendered by international adjudicators
applying international norms, then the independence of those adjudicators
is of paramount concern. Without legal independence, legitimacy will
59.
60.
INT'L

See SLAUGHTER, supra note 24.

Olli Lagerspetz, National Self-Determination and Ethnic Minorities, 25 MICH. J.

L. 1299 (2004).

61.
Kalypso Nicolaidis, We, the Peoples of Europe.... 83(6) FOR. AFF. 97 (2004)
[hereinafter We, the Peoples].
62.
Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457, 460-62 (2000).
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never follow. "[A]ccess measures the range of social and political actors
who have legal standing to submit a dispute to be resolved. 63 Access can
be extremely restrictive (as the ICJ represents--only states have access)
to more permissive (as the ECJ represents-individuals have standing to
come before the ECJ). 6 Keohane refers to the idea of enforcement as
embeddedness .65 Because international laws must be implemented by
states, the more embedded the decisions are into the domestic structure,
the more legitimacy the norm has. As with each factor, embeddedness
ranges from low (where states may veto decisions post facto as in the
former GATT) to high (where states respect decisions such as ECJ decisions). These procedures and rules help legitimize international norms
and also display how disaggregated states and individuals may now play
a role in norm interpretation.
Further, if international law was originally about preserving diversity
within the confines of the state, as Stephen Krasner argues, thus supporting the liberal aim to curb the "tyranny of the many," even while this
may sometimes contradict the democratic project to curb the "tyranny of
the few," then should international law not be constructed to safeguard
against the tyranny of global majorities as well? Karel Wellens' discussion of how accountability rules should apply to international
organizations provides an illustration of this dilemma. 66
Perhaps the real question is not just who has the right or authority to
create international norms-whether it be Jody Williams who got the
landmine treaty off the ground 67 or George Bush who keeps the mines in
the ground-but fundamentally to what extent the contested nature of
sovereignty promotes democracy simply because it counters a monopoly
of power. As Robert Howse argues regarding the WTO, what matters is
less the international law itself and more the way in which these organizations generate meaning about the role of the state itself in our
everyday lives.
C. Justice
Third and last, even democracy can be considered as a means to an
end-that of an international system which best combines order and justice beyond borders. From an international relations viewpoint, the
combination of the end of the cold war and globalization has radically
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 462.
Id.at 462-64.
Id. at 466.

Karel Wellens, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw and Establishingand Account66.
ability Regime for InternationalOrganizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap,
25 MICH. J. INT'LL. 1159 (2004).
Koh, supra note 17.
67.
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eroded the traditional divide between the pursuit of justice within the
state and that of order between states. 68 Little by little, a global justice
agenda is being shaped-whether retributive or distributive-even if international law is only part of it.
Thus, for instance, when scholars assessed fragmentation on the basis of the values underpinning sovereignty itself-they encourage us to
look for ways to extend to international law domestic legal principles
that have to do with human dignity and fairness. Likewise, when P.S.
Rao defends the Law of the Sea tribunal as a way to nurture a new concept of "common heritage of mankind," he encourages us to explore how
other regimes may internalize this agenda. 69 When Daniel Philpott
stresses that intervention is driven by a shared universal aversion to human suffering he encourages us to ask whether this imperative does not
in fact allow for the bypassing of state consent, thus positing the existence of a normative international community over and above the
international society of states, and whose greater solidaristic impulse
reflected into norms ought to be considered legitimately as a source of
international law. And when Jordan Paust argues that the expansion of a
global justice agenda requires direct individual responses this does not
exonerate state responsibility.70 In the end, we are left with a fundamental
tension between Daniel Philpott's initial assertion that international law
today comes close to a 17th century philosopher's dream of finding
common values to justify intervention (without denying sovereignty as a
relative norm) and the fact that the many individual and collective rights
embedded in international law often continue to be trampled on around
the world.
We cannot in this conclusion delve into the many negative and positive links between these three normative levels. Democratization can be
a prerequisite for effectiveness or it can be seen as a necessary cost. Contrast for instance the many cases of delegated authority where
democratizing participation becomes a precondition for the hardening of
soft law agreements (e.g., standardization bodies in the EU) and cases
where democratization on the contrary calls for relaxing traditional law
standards. Some ardent proponents of a global justice agenda may advocate a shift from procedural to substantive international justice but this in
turn can contradict the essence of democratic accountability at more local levels. Here again, the recourse to soft law and more generally,
diversification of the sources of law away from the "core" discussed
68.

HURRELL & FOOT, supra note 8.
69.
See Rao, supra note 9.
70.
Jordan Paust, The Reality of Private Rights, Duties, and Participationin the International Legal Process,25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1229 (2004).
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above can serve as a way of getting around the tension. This issue explores some such strategies of contournementand suggests many more.
V. CONCLUSION: INSTITUTIONALIZING DIVERSITY?
FUTURE DEBATE

This issue does not have one single overarching set of positive or
normative conclusions. Instead, let us suggest three areas where we believe some creative work can make a difference.
A. Deepening Horizontality and Mutuality: ManagedMutual
Recognition and Global Subsidiarity
One first impression of the challenge raised by the diversification of
sources of international law is to consider such diversification as one
expression of the growing unbundling between political territory and
legal jurisdiction. With the mutual recognition of laws and their extraterritorial application, we increasingly recognize and accept that
consumers, citizens or other kinds of actors may simply be exposed to
several laws at once or sequentially on the same territory and that this is
part of globalization. At the same time, fierce debates are taking place on
the extent to which the application of rules of origins to the movement of
professionals and not only goods may lead to social dumping and lesser
consumer protection. This is why mutual recognition, when it is indeed
applied, is "managed" in order to constrain some of its potential detrimental effects.7' In effect, mutual recognition of laws is the legal analogy
and institutionalization of what Saskia Sassen describes as transnational
sovereignty whereby part of the "global" is endogenous to the state.72 In
this sense, legal pluralism is not only a normative commitment but a lens
through which to analyze the world as it is evolving today. Outside observers need to understand for instance that European integration, for
example, rests not on a dynamic of progressive convergence of different
laws and regulations, but instead on the constant refinement of the techniques of managed mutual recognition. The EU has chosen not to adopt
71.

On managed mutual recognition, see for instance KALYPSO
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(1997); Kalypso
Nicolaidis & Michelle Egan, TransationalMarket Governance and Regional Policy Externality: Why Recognize Foreign Standards?, 8(3) J. EUR. PUBLIC POL'Y 454 (2001). These
contours of such "management" continue to be highly contested in the European Union. In
March 2004, the Commission insisted that its single patent project was incompatible with the
current system of mutual recognition of enforcement in national courts. See also the fierce
debates in November 2004, around the so-called Bolkenstein directive on freedom to provide
services across borders on the basis of the country of origin's standards.
72.
Sassen, supra note 47.
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a single patent system but rather a system of mutual recognition of patent enforcement in national courts under the same approach adopted for
most other parts of the single market.
There is a broader ontological underpinning to such an emphasis on
recognition ought to apply to relationships between collective entities. In
The Federal Vision, we called for a shift of emphasis from multilevel
governance to multi-centered governance and multi-centered law.73 Today, if the EU was founded on the discipline of tolerance-including
what J.H.H. Weiler refers to as Constitutional tolerance74 then the EU
constitutional project should not be founded on the assumption that everyone in the EU is part of a single demos in the making, but should
instead be about recognizing, sharing, and confronting our different
identities. " mOne may disagree on whether understanding the EU as
demoi-cracy should lead one to reject a formal constitution. At a minimum however, the EU's new constitutional order should reflect that the
character of the EU as an expression of legal pluralism and nonhierarchical governance. In short, the Constitution gets it right when it
gives a direct role to national parts in the shaping of EU law through the
subsidiarity test but gets it wrong when it fails to give due place to the
open method of cooperation.
A celebration of diversity in the sources of international law goes
hand in hand with that of horizontality in world affairs. What do we
mean by that? If Westphalia is the story of a move from vertical order to
a horizontal order based on state consent, managing diversity in today's
world does not mean recovering the "paradise lost" of Westphalian state
sovereignty, but rather deepening and expanding the horizontality that
started with the Peace of Westphalia, through management of differences
at the global level using both laws and institutions. We must resist the
attraction of creating hierarchies of norms 76 and corresponding integrative institutions-such as a hierarchical court system some scholars
advocate.77 This issue suggests that the key question here is how to
73.
See THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 58.
74.
See J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism without Constitutionalism: Europe's Sonderweg, in
THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 58, at 54.
75.
EU leaders approved the Constitutional treaty on June 18, 2004. However, each
member state must ratify the constitution for it to come into effect. See We, the Peoples, supra
note 61; see also Kalypso Nicolaidis, The New Constitutionas European Demoi-cracy?, (The
Federal Trust, Online Paper 38/03, Dec. 2003), at http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/euconstitution.
76.
The symposium brought to light the rich contextual debate on the different methods
of achieving the same benefit that hierarchy and institutional integration could bring. In some
cases, hierarchy could create friction-as between different courts as Charles Koch argued or
as Gunther Teubner argued that some of the most successful law-making results from "mutual
irritation." See Charles H. Koch, Judicial Dialogue for Legal Multiculturalism, 25 MIcH. J.
INT'L L. 879 (2004); Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 15.
77.
See Abi-Saab, supra note 3.
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receive through other means, the benefits stemming from hierarchy and
institutional integration (e.g., quality, clarity, transparency). Thus judicial
dialogue should be preferred over formalized hierarchy (between courts)
that exacerbates tensions. Teubner provides a provocative image of law
making through mutual irritation and provocation between network
nodes across regimes." Howse and Nicolaidis have discussed how global
subsidiarity calls for horizontal deference between functional institutions
and courts while requiring at the same time mutual inclusiveness in each
other's institutions or countries.7 9 Nevertheless one may ask with Rao if
vertical deference of a certain kind ("inspired but not bound") is not in
the end the fundamental precondition for horizontal deference. ° Likewise, Joost Pauwelyn's call for accepting interconnected but separate
legal islands does not address situations with inherent normative conflicts or what Teubner describes as radically different rationalities."
Conflicts of law cannot solve all conflicts between systems of law.
Essentially, when we fear cacophony at the global level we must resist the temptation of seeking harmony-but rather, rejoice in the
contrapuntal, playing together along different scores. As with chamber
music, if the players listen to each other, they can do away entirely with
a conductor.
B. Bringing Politics Back In
The second line of enquiry which we see emerging from this project
is that of the relationship between politics and law-making through
courts in an increasingly globalized world. We believe that if international law's relevance is to survive its unavoidable fragmentation, we
need more politics not less. This is not to echo classical realists', political scientists from Carr to Keenan, who criticized legalism as divorced
from power and politics. In fact, international law has always played
politics in any case by empowering some actors and disempowering others within domestic polity. Today, the normative justification for such
empowerment must be made more explicit and grounded in a more fundamental political debate on the ethics of globalization.
How then should the interface between political and judicial law
making be managed and by whom? What is the space for legitimate politicization between the delegation of conflict-management to groups of
"wise men" and simply going to war? Is peace to be founded in Kojeve's
78.
See Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 15.
79.
Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 78 (2003).
80.
See Rao, supra note 9.
81.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 18; Fischer-Lescano & Teubner, supra note 15.
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universal homogenous state where technical and legal adjudication determines acceptable differences? Or should the boundary between
acceptable and non-acceptable difference be determined through political conflict and contestation between countries or groups of people? And
if so, how do we avoid an international politics between closed groups
promoting instead a diagonal politics where national debates interpenetrate each other?
If democratic coexistence is not about harmony per se, but rather
about creative conflict or confrontation, then there are important prescriptive consequences such as Joost Pauwelyn's call for including more
conflict of law clauses in treaties themselves, all the way to greater allowance for temporary opt-outs and safeguards, all ways of adjusting the
binding character of international law to the circumstances that affect its
internalization and ultimate legitimacy.82
The emphasis of international law should increasingly be on procedural rather than substantive justice, the latter being the domain of
politics.83 By making national democracy work better through local empowerment, a global politics is not a constraint on diversity but its
guarantee. It may have a more radical effect than substantive edicts
(aimed at outcomes rather than process) if previously disenfranchised
groups are empowered in the process. In such a world, the role of the
judge is to ensure that common rules of the game not to dictate outcome.
If a country can demonstrate the truly democratic character of domestic
choices including some degree of inclusiveness of non-domestic constituencies than these choices must trump requirements of legal
consistency. This is what the EU is currently seeking to convey with the
notion of "collective preferences." There are some cases where collective
preferences have been turned into democratically grounded "collective
choices" which at the domestic level are supposed to trump individual
market choices (e.g., the U.S. ban on dolphin-unfriendly tuna or turtle
un-friendly shrimp). In such cases, we must applaud when the WTO Appellate Body tells a country how to come to a decision rather than what
decisions it is allowed to make. This is all the more important if we believe with John Jackson that the WTO provides guidance for the future
rather than redress prior harm. In this light, the idea of constitutionalizing the WTO to settle value trade-offs once and for all as a guide to
judges may be misguided but we must explore alternative paradigm for

82.
See Pauwelyn, supra note 18.
83.
See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse, "This is My EU-topia . . .": Narrative as
Power, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 767 (2002) [hereinafter My EU-topia].
84.
See Jackson, supra note 50.
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upholding ethical standards and human rights in the context of trade relations.85
There are of course many difficult questions to delve into under such
assumptions. In particular, if the on-going involvement of external actors
in domestic governance should not be about results but process how
exactly does one measure the threshold of appropriate involvement? If
international law is to establish what Teubner refers to as "collusion
rules" to adjudicate between colliding rationality principles and address
conflicts between regime under what conditions does this create a space
for political dispute resolution rather than preempt politics altogether?
Legal roadmaps are useful and even necessary but they cannot and
should not pre-determine the twists and turns of the journeys that we
make. The debate, no doubt, continues.
C. Diversity as a Source of Power
Finally, let us highlight a question that has hardly been touched upon
during this symposium, the idea that legal diversity can be a source of
normative power. For example, "the clash of exceptionalisms" between
the EU and the U.S., where the two international powers compete in exporting their political and legal model to the rest of the world. What are
the factors that favor one exceptionalism over the other? Is the EU's own
version of inter-national law more relevant than the U.S.' advocacy of its
domestic law with universal appeal? Many in the EU believe so precisely
because the EU sells itself as a benign model of international law offering a "toolbox" for the management of diversity. 6 The hypothesis here is
that the EU's power stems from, not the growing ability to speak with
one voice (Iraq not withstanding) as mainstream thinking has it, but
rather its ability to offer a chorus of voices to the world.
But is that not a very complacent story on the part of the EU? If international law expands by making the preservation of diversity in the
real world itself a common good87 should legal diversity beyond the EU
itself be preserved from this logic? If what is at stake is in Koch's formulation "tapping the wisdom of the world's legal cultures"88 why should
85.
See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy through "HigherLaw?" Why
Constitutionalizingthe WTO is a Step Too Far, in THOMAS COTTIER ET AL., THE ROLE OF THE
JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS FOR THE WTO
(2003).
86.
While the U.S. sets up law foundations around the world to sell one united legal
system, the EU, on the other hand, plugs the many different models it has to offer. See My EUtopia, supra note 83.
87.
For a discussion on cultural heritage, see Lagerspect, supra note 60; Francesco
Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: the Protection of CulturalHeritage as a Shared Interest
of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1209 (2004).
88.
Koch, supra note 74.
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the EU still be "a model" as in Francesco de Vitoria's time? In the quest
for managed diversity isn't the idea of the EU as a conductor or a model
a self-contradiction, even if its claim rests on its own internal legal pluralism? What would it take to create a truly post-colonial vision of
international law and what should be the role of the EU in this project?
This is one of the many questions that must be explored next.

